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Abstract	  
Increased	  and	  widespread	   regional	   collective	  action	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	   (MENA)	  
during	  the	  recent	  Arab	  revolutions	  reflects	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  marked	  change	  in	  the	  structure	  and	  
the	   strategies	  used	  by	   young	  organised	  activists.	   This	  period	  has	  witnessed	  greater	  organisation	  
efforts	   from	   young	   actors,	   taking	   the	   role	   of	   leaders	   and	   organisers,	   which	   have	   resulted	   in	   a	  
variety	   of	   social	  movements	   that	   pursue	   strategies	   different	   from	   former	   ones.	   I	   argue	   that,	   in	  
Jordan,	  the	  Jordanian	  Al-­‐Ḥirāk	  Ash-­‐Shabābī	  (Youth	  Movement)	  represents	  this	  new	  regional	  trend	  
of	  youth-­‐led,	   youth-­‐organised,	   informal,	  uninstitutionalized,	  horizontal,	  network-­‐like	  organization	  
that	   is	   re-­‐defining	  what	  dissent	   looks	   like	   in	   the	  country	   today.	   In	   the	  case	  of	   Jordan,	   the	  role	  of	  
youth	  has	  been	  widely	  understudied,	  resulting	  in	  an	  incomplete	  interpretation	  of	  this	  revolutionary	  
period	   in	   Jordan.	   The	  aim	  of	   this	   paper	   is	   to	   contribute	   to	   this	   gap	  of	   knowledge,	   analysing	   the	  
movement’s	  appearance	  and	  organisation	  to	  present	  its	  overall	  socio-­‐political	  characteristics.	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Resumen	  
El	  aumento	  y	  la	  expansión	  de	  la	  acción	  colectiva	  en	  Oriente	  Medio	  y	  el	  Norte	  de	  África	  durante	  las	  
recientes	  revoluciones	  árabes,	  reflejan	  la	  existencia	  de	  un	  cambio	  significativo	  en	  la	  estructura	  y	  las	  
estrategias	  empleadas	  por	  activistas	  jóvenes	  organizados.	  Este	  periodo	  se	  ha	  caracterizado	  por	  un	  
mayor	   esfuerzo	   organizativo	   por	   parte	   de	   los	   jóvenes,	   que	   han	   adoptado	   el	   papel	   de	   líderes	   y	  
organizadores,	   resultando	   en	   una	   variedad	   de	   movimientos	   sociales	   que	   ponen	   en	   marcha	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estrategias	  diferentes	  a	  las	  que	  se	  empleaban	  con	  anterioridad.	  En	  Jordania,	  Al-­‐Ḥirāk	  Ash-­‐Shabābī	  
(Movimiento	   de	   Jóvenes)	   representa	   esta	   nueva	   tendencia	   regional	   —movimientos	   liderados	   y	  
organizados	   por	   jóvenes,	   de	   carácter	   informal	   y	   no	   institucional,	   y	   organizados	   como	   una	   red	  
horizontal	   no	   jerarquizada—	   que	   está	   redefiniendo	   la	   disidencia	   hoy.	   En	   el	   caso	   de	   Jordania,	   el	  
papel	   de	   los	   jóvenes	   no	   ha	   sido	   estudiado	   en	   profundidad,	   lo	   que	   ha	   resultado	   en	   una	  
interpretación	   incompleta	   de	   este	   periodo	   revolucionario	   en	   Jordania.	   Este	   artículo	   tiene	   como	  
objetivo	   reducir	   esta	   brecha	   de	   conocimiento,	   analizando	   la	   aparición	   y	   organización	   del	  
movimiento,	  presentando	  sus	  características	  socio-­‐políticas	  principales.	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Introduction	  
Increased	  and	  widespread	  regional	  collective	  action	   in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  (MENA)	  
during	  the	  recent	  Arab	  revolutions1,	  which	  has	  later	  taken	  different	  forms	  and	  directions	  in	  each	  
case,	  reflects	  the	  existence	  of	  new	  dynamics	  for	  analysis	  in	  societies	  that	  were	  thought	  to	  languish	  
in	  a	  stagnant	  status	  quo.	  They	  challenge	  the	  opinion	  of	  some	  scholars	  such	  as	  Berman	  who	  some	  
years	  ago	  wrote	  that	  ‘the	  most	  probable	  scenario	  in	  Egypt	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Arab	  world	  is	  regime	  
persistence	   rather	   than	   its	   collapse	   in	   the	   near	   future’	   (Berman,	   2003:	   19).	  Moreover,	   the	   role	  
taken	  by	   youth,	   as	   leaders	   and	  organisers	  of	   this	   new	  wave	  of	   contention,	   contradicts	  with	   the	  
idea	  of	  Arab	  youth	  as	  apolitical	  and	  conformist	  which	  was	  dominant	  before	  2011.	  
Since	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  Arab	   revolutions,	   new	  dynamics	   have	   been	  present	  which	  make	   the	  
question	   on	  what	   the	   young	   do	  —in	   terms	   of	   networking,	   organising,	   deploying	   resources,	   or	  
mobilizing—	   increasingly	   relevant2.	  We	   find	   that	   in	   this	   recent	   period,	   youth	   actors	   that	   do	  not	  
belong	   to	   traditional	   structures	   have	   started	   mobilising	   independently	   and	   in	   an	  
uninstitutionalized	  manner.	  Moreover,	  we	  see	  that	  this	  period	  has	  witnessed	  greater	  organisation	  
efforts	   from	   young	   actors,	   taking	   the	   role	   of	   leaders	   and	   organisers,	   which	   have	   resulted	   in	   a	  
variety	   of	   social	   movements	   that	   pursue	   strategies	   different	   from	   former	   ones	   in	   the	   form	   of	  
‘quiet	  encroachment’3.	  	  
Since	  2011,	  youth	  activism	  has	  become	  ‘loud’	  regionally,	  and	  there	  has	  been	  a	  marked	  change	  in	  
the	   structure	   and	   the	   strategies	   used	   by	   these	   young	   social	   actors.	   Structures	   and	   strategies	  
mobilised	   by	   different	   social	   actors,	   and	   the	   varying	   regime	   response,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   social	   and	  
political	  significance	  of	  mobilisation,	  have	  differed	  between	  cases,	  reaffirming	  the	   importance	  of	  
the	  existing	  regional	  heterogeneity.	  Therefore,	  there	   is	  an	   imperative	  need	  to	  carry	  out	   in-­‐depth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   Different	   terms	   have	   been	   coined	   to	   try	   to	   capture	   the	   essence	   of	   recent	   revolutionary	   episodes	   such	   as	   ‘Arab	  
Spring’,	   ‘Arab	  Uprisings’,	   ‘Arab	  Awakening’,	   or	   ‘Facebook	   Revolutions’.	   I	   prefer	   to	   call	   them	   ‘Arab	   revolutions’	   as	   a	  
literal	   translation	  of	   how	   it	  was	  normally	   called	   in	  Arabic	   among	   activists	   (ﺔﯿﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟاﺍ تﺕاﺍرﺭﻮﺜﻟاﺍ	  –	  ath-­‐thawrāt	   al-­‐ʿarabiyyat)	  
before	  the	  term	  ‘Arab	  Spring’	  was	  literally	  translated	  into	  Arabic.	  I	  agree	  with	  Hanafi	  that	  this	  term	  better	  accounts	  for	  
the	  radical	  regional,	  social	  and	  political	  transformations	  in	  politics	  and	  political	  subjectivities.	  See	  HANAFI,	  S.	  (2012).	  
2	  Before	  the	  Arab	  revolutions,	  youth	  as	  a	  social	  category	  was	  studied	  together	  with	  the	  urban	  dispossessed,	  Muslim	  
women,	   and	   other	   urban	   grass-­‐roots,	   coming	   to	   form	   what	   this	   author	   defines	   as	   ‘the	   subaltern’.	   See	   BAYAT,	   A.	  
(2010).	  Youth	  nonmovements	  ‘characterized	  less	  by	  what	  the	  young	  do	  (networking,	  organizing,	  deploying	  resources,	  
mobilizing)	  than	  by	  how	  they	  are	  (in	  behaviors,	  outfits,	  ways	  of	  speaking	  and	  walking,	  in	  private	  and	  public	  spaces).	  
3	  Bayat	   (2010)	  presents	   ‘quiet	   encroachment’	   as	   ‘quiet,	   largely	   atomized,	   and	  prolonged	  mobilization	  with	  episodic	  
collective	  action—	  open	  and	  fleeting	  struggles	  without	  clear	  leadership,	  ideology,	  or	  structured	  organization’.	  Before	  
the	  Arab	  revolutions,	  these	  strategies	  were	  prevalent,	  resulting	  in	  the	  ideas	  of	  apolitical	  Arab	  youth.	  Ibid.	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research	  that	  sheds	   light	  on	  new	  actors,	  new	  forms	  of	  organisation,	  and	  new	  strategies	  that	  will	  
re-­‐frame	  our	  understanding	  of	  regional	  politics	  and	  society.	  
In	   Jordan,	   the	   Jordanian	  Al-­‐Ḥirāk	   Ash-­‐Shabābī	   (Youth	  Movement)	   represents	   this	   new	   regional	  
trend	   of	   youth-­‐led,	   youth-­‐organised,	   informal,	   uninstitutionalized,	   horizontal,	   network-­‐like	  
organization	   that	   is	   re-­‐defining	   what	   dissent	   looks	   like	   in	   the	   country	   today.	   The	   role	   of	   the	  
Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement	  has	  been	  widely	  understudied,	  resulting	  in	  a	  misrepresentation	  of	  this	  
revolutionary	  period	   in	   Jordan.	  The	  aim	  of	   this	  paper	   is	   to	   contribute	   to	   this	   gap	  of	   knowledge,	  
analysing	   the	   movement’s	   appearance	   and	   organisation	   to	   present	   its	   overall	   socio-­‐political	  
characteristics.	  
	  
The	  origins	  of	  Youth	  contention	  in	  Amman:	  the	  24th	  March	  2011	  sit-­‐in	  
On	   Thursday	   24th	  March	   2011,	   an	   assorted	   group	   of	   young	   Jordanians	   gathered	   after	   the	   noon	  
prayer	  on	  Duwwār	  Ad-­‐Dākhiliyya,	  the	  ‘circle’	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Interior,	  in	  the	  capital	  city	  Amman4.	  
Their	  aim	  was	  to	  organise	  a	  sit-­‐in	  that	  would	  gather	  more	  people	  on	  Friday,	  weekend	  holiday	  for	  
the	  majority	   in	   Jordan.	  Duwwār	   Ad-­‐Dākhiliyya	   is	   the	   roundabout	   or	   junction	   in	   central	   Amman	  
where	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Interior	   is	   located.	   In	   Jordan,	   spaces	   are	   chosen	   by	   activists	   to	   facilitate	  
mobilisation	   or	   because	   of	   its	   symbolism,	   and	   among	   other	   symbolic	   spaces	   where	   political	  
protests	   frequently	   take	   place5,	   youth	   decided	   to	  mobilise	   outside	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Interior	   that	  
day.	  	  
Three	  months	  into	  the	  Arab	  revolutions,	  these	  young	  Jordanians	  had	  been	  leading	  and	  organising	  
weekly	  Friday	  protests,	  in	  different	  locations,	  since	  January	  2011.	  Under	  the	  banner	  of	  ‘yawm	  al-­‐
ghadhab’	   (Day	   of	   Anger),	   these	   actions,	   although	   organisationally	   divided,	   shared	   a	   common	  
feature:	   anger.	   March	   24	   was	   the	   first	   time	   that	   all	   these	   small	   ‘angry’	   constituencies	   were	  
gathering	  to	  do	  something	  together,	  something	  similar	  to	  what	  youth	  was	  organising	  in	  other	  Arab	  
countries	   regional	   cases.	   In	   line	   with	   other	   regional	   initiatives,	   such	   as	   the	   6th	   April	   Youth	  
Movement6	  in	  Egypt	  (Carr,	  2012;	  Ottaway	  and	  Hamzawy,	  2011),	  or	  the	  20th	  February	  Movement7	  
in	  Morocco	   (Desrues,	   2012a),	   youth	   had	   organised	   this	   joint	   sit-­‐in	   under	   the	   name	   24th	  March	  
Youth8.	  	  
The	  24th	  March	  Youth	  became	  the	  umbrella	  that	  gathered	  assorted	  young	  Jordanians,	  mainly	  of	  a	  
socialist	  and	  leftist	  background.	  The	  way	  activists	  behaved	  at	  prayer	  times	  during	  the	  sit-­‐in	  reflect	  
this.	  With	  the	  adhān	  (call	  for	  prayer)	  in	  Islamist	  organized	  protests,	  everyone	  lines	  up	  and	  prays.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This	   research	   is	  based	  on	  fieldwork	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  author	  since	  2011	   in	   Jordan.	  The	  fieldwork	   is	  conformed	  of	  
participant	   observation,	   interviews,	   and	   focus	   groups.	   The	   author	   has	   decided	   that,	   due	   to	   security	   reasons,	   the	  
names	  of	  interviewees	  for	  this	  research	  will	  remain	  anonymous.	  	  
5	  These	  spaces	  include	  Al-­‐Husseini	  mosque	  in	  Downtown,	  the	  parliament,	  the	  prime	  ministry,	  the	  Israeli	  embassy,	  the	  
US	  embassy,	  or	  the	  road	  to	  the	  King	  Hussein	  Bridge	  connecting	  Jordan	  and	  Israel.	  
6	   6th	   of	   April	   Youth	   Movement	   -­‐	   ﻞﯾﻳﺮﺑإﺇ 6 بﺏﺎﺒﺷ ﺔﻛﺮﺣ	   (ḥarakat	   shabāb	   6	   ʿibrīl).	   Facebook	   page	   available	   at:	  
https://www.facebook.com/shabab6april?fref=ts	  	  
7	   Mouvement	   20	   février	   –	    ﺔﻛﺮﺣ20 ﺮﯾﻳاﺍﺮﺒﻓ 	   (ḥarakat	   20	   fibrāīr).	   Facebook	   page	   available	   at:	  
https://www.facebook.com/groups/AdminGroupMoov20Feb/	  	  
8	   رﺭاﺍذﺫآﺁ 24 بﺏﺎﺒﺷ	   (Shabāb	   24	   ʿAdhār).	   Facebook	   page	   available	   at:	  
https://www.facebook.com/shbab.march.24?ref=ts&fref=ts	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However,	   at	   the	   fajr	   prayer,	   around	   5.00	   am	   on	   the	   night	   of	   the	   24th	   March	   in	   Duwwār	   Ad-­‐
Dākhiliyya,	  only	  around	  tens	  of	  activists	  went	  to	  a	  corner	  to	  pray.	  ‘The	  vast	  majority	  did	  not’9.	  	  
The	   majority	   of	   activists	   that	   organized	   on	   the	   24th	   March	   had	   been	   participating	   in	   protests	  
throughout	   their	   lives,	   and	   were	   politically	   conscious.	   However,	   they	   had	   very	   little	   or	   no	  
experience	   in	  organizing	  and	   leading	  a	  movement.	  The	  organization	  of	   the	  24th	  March	  had	  been	  
worked	  on	  during	  the	  weeks	  that	  preceded	  the	  sit-­‐in	  on	  social	  media.	  Their	  Facebook	  ‘community’	  
had	   been	   their	  main	   channel	   to	   reach	   audiences	   and	   publish	   the	   decisions	   they	   had	   agreed	   to	  
organize	  around.	  The	  sit-­‐in	  was	  called	  for	  because	  of	  their	  ‘love’	  and	  ‘commitment’	  to	  the	  country;	  
it	  would	  be	  ‘peaceful’	  and	  ‘popular’,	  calling	  ‘for	  national	  unity’	  and	  ‘against	  social	  fragmentation’10.	  	  
Already	  before	  the	  24th	  March,	  activists	  had	  been	  facing	  huge	  pushback	  from	  loyalists.	  Online,	  on	  
their	  Facebook	  page,	  numerous	  comments	  were	  published	  criticizing	  this	  initiative	  and	  calling	  for	  
the	  protection	  of	  Jordan.	  As	  well	  as	  online,	  loyalists	  organized	  rallies	  and	  mass	  demonstrations	  of	  
loyalty	  to	  the	  king.	   In	  response	  to	  these	  different	  forms	  of	  criticism,	  youth	  organizers	  of	  the	  24th	  
March	  reminded	  their	  audiences	  of	  the	  peaceful	  nature	  of	  their	  initiative;	  ‘Do	  not	  disrupt	  citizens’	  
interests;	  the	  sit-­‐in	  is	  peaceful,	  peaceful,	  peaceful.	  We	  will	  not	  close	  Duwwār	  Ad-­‐Dākhiliyya’11.	  	  
Pushback	  from	  loyalist	  groups	  manifested	  itself	  on	  the	  same	  24th	  March	  with	  the	  organization	  of	  a	  
pro-­‐monarchy	  rally	   in	  Dabouq12	  by	  the	  business	  elite.	  To	  understand	   loyalty	  today	   in	  Jordan,	  we	  
have	   to	   think	   back	   to	   1989	   bread	   riots,	   followed	   by	   Jordan’s	   first	   International	  Monetary	   Fund	  
(IMF)	   loan,	  and	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	   liberal	  autocratic	  development	  of	   Jordan.	  At	   that	  moment,	  
state	   interests	   were	   realigned,	   and	   loyalty	   was	   established	   with	   the	   military	   and	   the	   security	  
apparatus,	  which	  are	  majority	  Jordanians	  of	  Jordanian	  origin,	  and	  the	  business	  elite,	  which	  are	  in	  
their	  majority	  Jordanians	  of	  Palestinian	  origin	  that	  benefitted	  from	  the	  development	  of	  the	  private	  
sector.	   Since	   then,	   loyalty	   can	   no	   longer	   be	   completely	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   historically	  
constructed	   Transjordanian/Palestinian-­‐Jordanian	   ethnical	   division	   only.	   Loyalty	   in	   Jordan	   is	  
increasingly	  secured	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  division	  between	  those	  who	  have	  more,	  and	  those	  who	  have	  
less.	  	  
‘The	  majority,	  regardless	  of	  our	  demographic	  background,	   is	  becoming	  socio-­‐economically	  
marginalized	   and	   disenfranchised,	   and	   suddenly	   we	   have	   less.	   And	   then	   there	   is	   this	  
business	  elite	  that	  now	  has	  more’13.	  
Thinking	  back	  on	  the	  way	  loyalty	  looks	  like	  in	  Jordan	  today,	  helps	  us	  understand	  what	  happened	  
on	  the	  24th	  March,	  shortly	  after	  youth	  gathered	  in	  Duwwār	  Ad-­‐Dākhiliyya.	  Across	  the	  street	  from	  
where	  activists	  were	  holding	  their	  sit-­‐in,	  around	  chants	  like	  ‘peaceful...	  peaceful...	  peaceful’	  or	  ‘our	  
pride	  and	  our	  freedom...	  in	  the	  unity	  of	  Jordan’,	  a	  loyalist	  group	  started	  gathering.	  Activists	  refer	  
to	  them	  balṭajiyya	  or	  ‘thugs’,	  and	  assert	  they	  were	  ‘people	  who	  were	  hired	  to	  go	  and	  beat	  other	  
people’14.	   These	   balṭajiyya	   brought	   speakers	   and	   started	   playing	   patriotic	   music	   while	   circling	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  blogger	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  author	  on	  the	  4th	  November	  2014.	  Abdoun,	  Amman,	  Jordan.	  
10	  Posted	  on	  their	  Facebook	  page,	  on	  Wednesday	  23rd	  March	  2011,	  at	  15.46	  hrs.	  	  
11	  Posted	  on	  their	  Facebook	  page,	  on	  Wednesday	  23rd	  March	  2011,	  18.33	  hrs.	  	  
12	   Dabouq	   is	   one	   of	   the	  most	   prestigious	   areas	   of	   the	   capital	   city	   of	   Amman.	   Located	   in	  West	   Amman,	   near	   King	  
Abdullah	  II’s	  Palace,	  it	  contains	  villas	  and	  palaces	  inhabited	  by	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  elite	  of	  Jordan.	  	  
13	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  blogger.	  Op.cit.	  
14	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  blogger.	  Op.cit.	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activists,	   overshadowing	   their	   claims.	   Moreover,	   as	   activists	   recorded	   first,	   and	   denounced	  
through	  online	  media	  later,	  these	  balṭajiyya	  were	  carrying	  knives	  and	  sticks15	  to	  threaten	  activists.	  	  
Naturally,	   fear	  started	  building	  among	  activists,	  who	  felt	   the	  situation	  could	  become	  violent	  any	  
minute.	  However,	  they	  continued	  trying	  to	  gather	  on	  the	  square	  as	  much	  people	  as	  possible	  from	  
those	  that	  were	  supporting	  them	  on	  social	  media.	  ‘Not	  only	  Facebook,	  we	  are	  also	  acting	  Face	  to	  
Face’16.	  With	  this	  call,	  and	  thanks	  to	  the	  mobile	  application	  they	  had	  created,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  live	  
streaming	   channel	   of	   events	   on	   the	   ground,	   more	   and	   more	   people	   started	   joining	   the	   sit-­‐in	  
throughout	  the	  night	  of	  the	  24th	  March.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  protestors,	  on	  the	  
morning	   of	   the	   25th	   March,	   buses	   started	   reaching	   the	   square,	   with	   more	   groups	   of	   loyalists	  
arriving	  from	  different	  areas	  in	  Jordan.	  	  
Seeing	  the	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  people	  gathering	  on	  the	  square	  around	  a	  small	  number	  of	  young	  
organisers,	  the	  Islamists	  showed	  up	  ‘in	  the	  last	  minute’17,	  giving	  the	  government	  the	  opportunity	  
to	  label	  it	  an	  Islamist	  sit-­‐in,	  hinting	  that	  ‘these	  are	  Palestinians	  trying	  to	  overthrow	  the	  monarchy’.	  
The	   regime	   was	   playing	   the	   card	   of	   identity	   politics	   to	   access	   the	   memory	   of	   1970	   Black	  
September	   civil	  war,	   particularly	   in	   older	   generations.	   This	  would	   surely	   influence	   the	   ‘security-­‐
minded	  and	  stability-­‐minded	  population’18	  to	  refrain	  from	  supporting	  activists.	  On	  the	  25th	  March,	  
the	  security	  forces	  dissolved	  the	  sit-­‐in	  with	  the	  use	  of	  force.	  	  
‘The	  regime	  was	  afraid	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Arab	  spring	  internally.	  There	  was	  a	  certain	  time	  
when	  the	  regime	  was	  feeling	  extremely	  scared,	  particularly	  on	  the	  24	  March	  2011.	  This	   is	  
maybe	  why	  they	  responded	  with	  the	  harshest	  security	  attitude	  that	  I	  have	  ever	  seen	  in	  my	  
time	   as	   a	   journalist.	   At	   that	   time	   they	   stopped	   this	   protest	   with	   huge	   use	   of	   force	   and	  
repression	  and	  violence.	  They	  used	  balṭajiyya	  a	  lot,	  and	  the	  regime	  had	  an	  attitude	  that	  we	  
had	  never	  seen	  in	  our	  lives	  against	  opposition	  in	  Jordan’19.	  
	  
The	  24th	  March	  2011	  remains	  in	  the	  memory	  of	  some	  as	  ‘a	  missed	  opportunity	  for	  society’;	  as	  an	  
‘opportunity	  completely	  capitalised	  on	  by	  the	  state,	  pushing	  out	  the	  pro-­‐Jordan	  propaganda	  once	  
again’20.	  However,	  for	  activists	  of	  the	  Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement,	  ‘the	  24th	  March	  was	  the	  start	  of	  
the	  movement.	  We	   saw	   the	  world	   around	  us	   transforming,	   people	   getting	  what	   they	  want	   in	   a	  
number	  of	  ways.	  Among	  them,	  people	  gathering	  in	  big	  assemblies	   in	  demonstrations	  and	  sit-­‐ins,	  
with	  specific	  demands	  related	  to	  taxes,	  education,	  health’21.	  
After	   the	  24th	  March	  was	  dissolved,	  a	  huge	  division	  with	   the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	   (MB)	  became	  
evident,	  creating	  divisions	  among	  young	  activists.	  Some	  of	  them	  never	  managed	  to	  agree	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Pictures	  posted	  on	  their	  Facebook	  page,	  for	  example	  on	  Saturday	  26th	  March	  2011,	  at	  20.47	  hrs,	  and	  Monday	  28th	  
March	  2011,	  at	  03.52	  hrs.	  
16	  Posted	  on	  their	  Facebook	  page,	  on	  Friday	  25th	  March	  2011,	  at	  13.25	  hrs.	  
17	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  blogger.	  Op.cit.	  
18	  Ibid. 
19	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  journalist	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  author	  in	  Arabic	  on	  the	  9th	  September	  2013.	  Jabal	  Amman,	  
Amman,	  Jordan.	  
20	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  blogger.	  Op.cit.	  
21	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  author	  in	  Arabic	  on	  the	  29th	  September	  2014.	  Jabal	  Lweibdeh,	  
Amman,	  Jordan.	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MB	  again	  while	  others	  moved	  closer	  to	  the	  MB.	  The	  latter	  would	  later	  form	  the	  ‘child’	  movement	  
of	   the	  MB,	  Al-­‐Ḥirāk	   Ash-­‐Shabāb	  Al-­‐ʿIslāmī	   (Islamist	   Youth	  Movement).	   Harsh	   criticism	   escalated	  
between	  the	  MB	  and	  young	  opposing	  activists	  while	  trying	  to	  find	  points	  of	  convergence	  after	  the	  
traumatic	  experience	  they	  shared	  on	  the	  25th	  March.	  However,	  this	  coalition	  strategy	  of	  trying	  to	  
find	  points	  of	  convergence	   failed	  when	  mutual	  accusations	  of	  being	  traitors	  or	  of	  being	  un-­‐loyal	  
citizens22	  appeared.	   ‘All	   this	  was	  a	  game	  from	  the	  power’23,	  explains	  an	  activist	  of	  the	  Jordanian	  
Youth	  Movement.	  This	  break	  happened	  mainly	  because	   ‘there	  were	  people	   in	  some	  groups	  that	  
were	   not	   activists’,	   they	   were	   ‘hackers’24,	   condemning	   the	   infiltration	   of	   what	   they	   saw	   as	  
informants	  of	  the	  regime	  that	  had	  the	  aim	  not	  only	  of	  informing,	  but	  also	  dividing.	  	  
The	   24th	   March	   and	   the	   period	   that	   followed	   led	   young	   activists	   to	   realise	   the	   importance	   of	  
organisation,	   the	   strength	   of	   other	   institutionalised	   parties,	   and	   the	   harsh	   environment	   they	  
would	   have	   to	   face	   later.	   They	   became	   aware	   of	   their	   variety	   of	   backgrounds	   and	   of	   the	  
importance	  of	  mobilising	   a	   common	   shared	  will	   of	   fighting	   together	   in	   order	   to	   organise	   into	   a	  
movement.	  For	  them,	  during	  the	  following	  months,	  ‘it	  became	  obvious	  that	  there	  was	  a	  problem	  
in	  working	  with	   the	   older	   generations;	   they	   think	   in	   a	   different	  way.’25	   After	   these	   events,	   the	  
movement	  took	  around	  one	  year	  to	  be	  established.	  On	  June	  2012,	  the	  Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement	  
was	  created.	  	  
	  
The	  creation	  of	  the	  Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement:	  What’s	  new?	  
The	   Jordanian	  Al-­‐Ḥirāk	  Ash-­‐Shabābī	   (Youth	  Movement)26,	  created	  on	   June	  2012,	   represents	   this	  
new	   regional	   trend	   of	   youth-­‐led,	   youth-­‐organised,	   informal,	   uninstitutionalized,	   horizontal,	  
network-­‐like	  organization	   that	   is	   re-­‐defining	  what	  dissent	   looks	   like	   in	   the	  country	   today.	   It	  was	  
created	   and	   is	   organised	   by	   young	   people	   that	   found	   it	   necessary	   to	   organise	   ‘a	   social,	   youth,	  
political	  frame	  which	  talks	  about	  us.’27	  Ideologically,	  the	  movement	  is	  an	  umbrella	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  
ideologies,	   and	   although	   the	   majority	   label	   their	   ideology	   as	   leftist,	   socialist,	   communist,	   or	  
nationalist,	   there	  are	  also	  a	   few	  Islamists:	   ‘They	  are	  the	   Islamists	  that	  we	  can	  call	  “defectors”	  of	  
the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood.’28	   It	   is	   necessary	   to	   clarify	   at	   this	   point	   that	   only	   part	   of	   the	   youth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  This	  discourse	  has	  high	  resonance	  in	  society	  until	  today,	  since	  it	  appeared	  strongly	  after	  the	  1970	  Black	  September	  
Civil	  War.	  It	  is	  normally	  used	  against	  the	  Palestinian	  community	  or	  the	  Islamist	  or	  MB	  support	  base.	  	  
23	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  29th	  September	  2014	  Op.cit.	  
24	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  29th	  September	  2014	  Op.cit.	  
25	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  author	  in	  Arabic	  on	  the	  4th	  September	  2013.	  Jabal	  Lweibdeh,	  
Amman,	  Jordan.	  
26	  Data	  used	   in	  this	  paper	  was	  gathered	  during	  extensive	  periods	  of	   research	  and	  participant	  observation	   in	   Jordan.	  
These	   periods	   of	   fieldwork	  were	   done	  during	   the	  months	   of	   September	   2011	   to	   September	   2012,	   in	   January	   2013	  
during	   the	   Parliamentary	   Elections	   in	   Jordan,	   in	   April	   2013,	   and	   three	   months	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   2013,	   when	   the	  
majority	   of	   the	   interviews	   were	   carried	   out.	   During	   my	   extensive	   fieldwork	   periods,	   I	   observe	   activists	   in	   the	  
movement	  during	  all	  the	  activities	  they	  carry	  out,	  including	  informal	  social	  gatherings,	  events,	  meetings,	  and	  diverse	  
public	   demonstrations	   such	   as	   marches	   and	   sit-­‐ins.	   As	   well	   as	   participatory	   observation,	   research	   includes	   semi-­‐
structured	   interviews,	  and	   focus	  groups.	  This	  provided	  me	  with	   invaluable	  primary	  data	   that	  enabled	  an	  analysis	  of	  
what	   activists	   think	   about	   the	  political	   situation	   in	   Jordan	  and	  about	   their	   organization	  activities	   and	   ideology.	   The	  
fluidity	   of	   the	   individual	   ascription	   of	   activists	   and	   constituencies	   in	   the	   movement	   makes	   it	   difficult	   to	   select	  
interviewees	  for	  this	  project	  and	  to	  define	  the	  movement’s	  boundaries.	  However,	  I	  use	  three	  ways	  to	  determine	  who	  
the	  activists	  are:	  first,	  I	  use	  snowballing	  sampling	  in	  interviews;	  second,	  I	  use	  the	  boundaries	  established	  by	  activists	  in	  
the	  interviews	  to	  questions	  on,	  for	  example,	  who	  can	  form	  part	  of	  constituencies;	  and	  finally,	  I	  use	  the	  constituencies’	  
identity	  as	  established	  in	  their	  manifestos.	  For	  security	  reasons,	  and	  although	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  interviewees	  want	  
their	  names	  to	  appear,	  all	  activists	  will	  remain	  anonymous.	  
27	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  4th	  September	  2013.	  Op.cit.	  
28	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  29th	  September	  2014	  Op.cit.	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activists	   that	   started	   protests	   in	   2011,	   were	   the	   ones	   that	   created,	   led,	   and	   organised	   the	  
Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement	   in	  2012.	   This	  movement	  does	  not	   include	  youth	   that	  was	  absorbed	  
into	   the	   ‘child’	  youth	  movements	  of	  other	   institutionalised	  opposition	  groups	  during	  2011,	  as	   in	  
the	   case	   of	   youth	   activists	   that	   joined	   the	   aforementioned	   Al-­‐Ḥirāk	   Ash-­‐Shabāb	   Al-­‐Islāmī	  
(Movement	  of	  Islamist	  Youth)	  affiliated	  to	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.	  	  
	  
An	  atomized	  and	  fluid	  movement	  	  
The	   movement	   is	   formed	   of	   constituencies29	   that	   are	   loosely	   organised	   as	   a	   network.	   These	  
constituencies	   are	   volatile,	   they	   frequently	   disappear,	   reappear,	   merge,	   and	   change	   name.	  
Activists	  of	   the	  movement	  move	   from	  one	  constituency	   to	  another,	  and	  some	  of	   them	  consider	  
themselves	  ‘independent’,	  or	  not	  linked	  to	  any	  particular	  constituency	  but	  to	  the	  movement	  as	  a	  
whole.	   Localising	   or	   drawing	   a	   defined	   line	   around	   the	   movement	   is	   difficult	   because	   of	   the	  
movement’s	   fluidity.	  On	   their	  Facebook	  page,	   they	  state	   their	   location	  as	  being	   in	   ‘every	   street,	  
every	  neighbourhood,	  every	  lane,	  every	  house’30.	  Constituencies	  notably	  vary	  in	  their	  organisation	  
and	  ideology,	  resulting	  in	  different	  conceptualizations	  of	  change	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  preferred	  ways	  of	  
reaching	  this	  change.	  The	  Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement	  is	  national,	  and	  although	  its	  main	  activities	  
and	  participants	  are	  localised	  in	  the	  capital	  city	  Amman,	  some	  constituencies	  are	  localised	  in	  other	  
governorates	   such	   as	  Madaba,	   Zarqa,	   Irbid,	  Ma’an,	   Kerak,	   Tafileh	   or	   Aqaba.	   The	   constituencies	  
vary	  in	  numbers	  in	  different	  locations,	  with	  bigger	  ones	  being	  present	  in	  the	  capital	  city	  Amman.	  	  
A	  youth	  movement	  
The	  Jordanian	  Al-­‐Ḥirāk	  Ash-­‐Shabābī	  (Youth	  Movement)	  presents	  itself	  in	  society	  and	  among	  other	  
movements	  as	  a	  youth	  movement,	  as	  shabābī	  in	  Arabic	  translates	  into	  English	  as	  ‘of	  youth’.	  Youth	  
is	  about	  age,	  an	  age	  group	  or	  a	  generation,	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  participants	  are	  aged	  below	  30.	  
Jordan	   is	  not	  an	  exception	  to	   the	  youth	  bulge	   that	  characterises	   the	  Arab	  region,	  and	   Jordanian	  
citizens	  aged	  between	  15-­‐30	  yrs	  of	   age	   constitute	  over	  30%	  of	   the	   total	  population	   (2011).	   The	  
movement	   presents	   itself	   as	   representative	   of	   this	   social	   cluster.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   disentangle	  
further	  the	  concept	  of	  youth	  and	  its	  relevance	  as	  a	  descriptive	  category.	  	  
Youth	  is	  also	  more	  than	  age.	  Youth	  is	  a	  complex	  social	  category	  which	  I	  relate	  to	  a	  period	  of	   life	  
transition,	   to	   shared	   social	   grievances	   or	   to	   the	   feeling	   of	   belonging	   to	   a	   social	   group.	   Youth	   is	  
transitioning	   from	   childhood	   to	   adulthood,	   with	   all	   the	   repercussions	   this	   entails	   politically,	  
economically,	  and	  socially.	  Shared	  grievances	  create	  solidarity	  between	  young	  people	  and	  derive	  
from	  a	   lack	  of	  economic	   independence,	  and	   from	  a	   feeling	  of	  social	  and	  political	  exclusion	   from	  
the	   centres	   of	   power.	   Young	   people	   have	   not	   yet	   become	   socially	   independent	   from	   the	   older	  
generations	   as	   these	   still	   largely	   influence	   their	   decisions,	   and	   feel	   excluded	   from	   political	  
decision-­‐making	  processes.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Naseem	  Tarawneh,	  a	  Jordanian	  activist	  blogger,	  ‘youth	  
should	  not	  be	  treated	  like	  some	  special	  subset	  to	  be	  catered	  to	  or	   ignored.	  When	  you	  represent	  
60%	  of	  a	  population	  you	  are	  the	  population’	  (Tarawneh,	  2011).	  Moreover,	  in	  Jordan	  and	  in	  other	  
Arab	   countries,	   youth	   face	   situations	   in	   which	   cultural	   scripts,	   messages,	   and	   codes	   of	   various	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  These	  constituencies	  include	  individuals,	  groups,	  unions,	  organisations	  and	  movements.	  
30	  In	  Arabic:	  ‘ﺖﯿﻴﺑوﻭ ةﺓرﺭﺎﺣوﻭ ﻲﺣوﻭ عﻉرﺭﺎﺷ ﻞﻛ‘	  (transcription:	  “kul	  shāriʿ	  wa	  ḥayy	  wa	  ḥāra	  wa	  bayt”).	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agencies	  of	  socialization	  are	  often	  inconsistent	  with	  their	  ideas,	  and	  the	  youth	  social	  movements	  
of	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  ‘reveal	  the	  genesis	  of	  a	  new	  generation	  sparked	  by	  the	  desire	  for	  civil	  liberties,	  
advocacy	   for	   human	   rights,	   and	   participatory	   democracy’	   (Khalaf	   and	   Saad	   Khalaf,	   2011:	   9;	  
Desrues,	  2012b).	  
	  
Beyond	  the	  ethnic	  and	  tribal	  frames	  
Ethnically,	   the	   youth	  movement	   includes	   citizens	   of	   Palestinian	   origin	   as	  well	   as	   Transjordanian	  
citizens.	   To	   talk	   about	   ethnicity	   in	   Jordan	  means	   to	   refer	   back	   to	   the	   historical	   construction	   of	  
ethnic	   divisions	   through	   an	   identity	   politics	   strategy	   put	   forward	   by	   the	   regime	   and	   through	  
warfare	  and	  refugee	  construction	  in	  neighbouring	  countries.	  Understanding	  this	  historical	  ethnical	  
composition	  of	  society	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  regime	  has	  tried	  to	  politically	  fragment	  ethnicities	  
will	  lead	  us	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement	  contradicts	  this	  ethnical	  historical	  
division.	  The	  struggle	  of	  youth	  in	  Jordan	  is	  a	  struggle	  of	  Jordanians	  of	  Palestinian	  origin	  as	  well	  as	  
Transjordanians.	   Palestinian-­‐Jordanians	   have	   remained	   away	   from	   any	   type	   of	   political	  
participation	   since	   the	   Black	   September	   civil	   war	   in	   1970,	   however	   now	   we	   see	   Palestinian-­‐
Jordanian	  youth	  is	  mobilising,	  and	  not	  alone;	  they	  are	  doing	  so	  together	  with	  Transjordanian	  youth	  
or	  tribal	  youth.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  predominant	  ‘backwards’	  idea	  of	  tribes,	  tribal	  youth	  is	  ‘a	  more	  
pragmatic,	  decently-­‐educated	  segment	  of	  youth	  that	  (in	  many	  cases)	  has	  formed	  a	  layer	  beneath	  
the	   advertised	   surface	   (i.e.	  the	   “dinosaurs”);	   a	   segment	   that	   is	   still	   struggling	   to	   translate	   their	  
grievances	  into	  political	  action	  through	  activism	  and	  street	  protest’	  (Tarawneh,	  2014).	  	  
This	  movement	   is	   therefore	  the	  only	  movement	  that	  challenges	  traditional	   frames	  of	  ethnic	  and	  
religious	   understandings	   of	   social	   and	   political	   subjectivities.	   In	   Jordan,	  multiple	   identities	   have	  
been	   deployed	   historically,	   and	   reinforced	   through	   different	   episodes	   of	   conflict.	   These	   have	  
resulted	   in	   current	   social	   fragmentation	   along	   several	   lines,	   including	   ethnical	  
(Transjordanian/Palestinian-­‐Jordanian),	  religious	  (Muslim,	  Christian,	  secular),	  urban/rural,	  class,	  or	  
gender.	   Traditional	   political	   opposition	   parties	   and	   movements,	   including	   their	   ‘child’	   youth	  
movements,	   are	   still	   working	   within	   these	   ethnic	   and	   religious	   frames	   (Jordanian-­‐Jordanian,	  
Palestinian-­‐Jordanian,	   Islamist,	   tribal,	   etc),	   however	   the	   Jordanian	   Youth	  Movement	   is	   trying	   to	  
challenge	   these	   traditional	   frames	   by	   mobilising	   a	   more	   inclusive	   discourse	   that	   favours	   unity	  
instead	  of	  social	  fragmentation	  and	  divisions.	  They	  do	  so	  by	  mobilising	  grievances	  that	  affect	  the	  
majority	   of	   Jordanian	   citizens,	   which	   have	   been	   socially,	   economically,	   and	   politically	   excluded,	  
particularly	   since	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   2000s	   and	   the	   realignment	   of	   political	   loyalties	  with	   the	  
beginning	   of	   an	   accelerated	   economic	   liberalisation	   in	   the	   country.	   This	   reflects	   on	   the	   way	   in	  
which	   youth	   mobilises	   in	   a	   way	   that	   contradicts	   the	   Jordanian-­‐Palestinian	   divide	   which	   they	  
consider	  has	  been	  promoted	  by	  the	  regime	  in	  its	  historical	  strategy	  of	  identity	  politics31.	  	  
The	  movement	  is	  predominantly	  male,	  and	  women	  are	  a	  notable	  minority	  among	  the	  activists	  that	  
participate	   in	   it.	  Some	  female	  activists	  refer	  to	  the	  ‘cultural	   limits’	   for	  women’s	  activism	  and	  the	  
need	  to	  ‘really	  understand	  and	  respect	  the	  culture	  we	  are	  in	  and	  work	  within	  this	  space	  and	  try	  to	  
develop	  on	  it’32.	  Moreover	  they	  assert	  talking	  about	  women	  and	  specific	  demands	  to	  socially	  and	  
politically	  empower	  women	  as	   ‘western	   thoughts’33	  and	  as	   ‘liberal’34.	   In	  general,	   the	  movement	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Interview with anonymous analyst and activist carried out by the author on the 15th September 2013. Jabal Amman, 
Amman, Jordan. 
32	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  author	  on	  the	  13th	  September	  2013.	  Jabal	  Lweibdeh,	  Amman,	  
Jordan.	  
33	  Ibid.	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does	  not	  include	  specific	  women’s	  issues	  in	  their	  demands	  and,	  because	  their	  demands	  intend	  to	  
improve	   the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	   situation	  as	  a	  whole,	  activists	  argue	   that	   this	  change	  
will	  inevitably	  be	  important	  for	  women,	  as	  a	  social	  category	  which	  is	  part	  of	  youth	  and	  of	  society35.	  
	  
Socio-­‐economic	  and	  residential	  profiles	  
Activists	   in	   the	   youth	  movement	   belong	   to	   a	   working	   class,	   both	   from	   poorer	   urban	   and	   rural	  
areas,	   and	  middle	   income	   neighbourhoods.	   Young	   activists	   try	   to	  make	   a	   living	   by	   undertaking	  
precarious	  jobs,	  many	  times	  multiple	  jobs	  at	  a	  time,	  that	  generally	  do	  not	  allow	  them	  to	  become	  
fully	   economically	   independent	   from	   their	   families.	   This	   applies	   to	   youth	   from	   poorer	   working	  
classes	  as	  well	  as	  to	  youth	  of	  middle-­‐income	  areas36.	  Tobin	  has	  analysed	  this	  middle	  and	  working	  
classes	   in	   Jordan,	   especially	   in	   Amman,	   and	   argued	   that	   the	   ‘heightened	  notion	   of	  middle-­‐class	  
status	   and	   “aspiring	   cosmopolitanism”	   provides	   a	   new	   significant	   form	   of	   social	   organisation	   in	  
Amman’,	   reorienting	   the	   population	   ‘away	   from	   political	   reform’	   and	   serving	   as	   ‘a	   means	   to	  
reinforce	  the	  status-­‐quo’	  (2012	  p.	  96).	  In	  this	  situation,	  activists	  in	  the	  Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement,	  
are	  confronting	  their	  families	  and	  environment,	  as	  well	  as	  risking	  their	  work	  places	  because	  ‘not	  
everyone	  is	  so	  accepting,	  it	  depends	  on	  your	  surroundings,	  working	  in	  this	  country	  is	  pretty	  hard,	  
you	  actually	  need	  to	  sacrifice’37.	  	  
	  
Goals	  
In	  the	  words	  of	  activists	  of	  the	  movement,	  their	  goals	  include	  ‘social	  equality’38	  and	  mobilising	  for	  
‘a	  country	  that	  is	  free	  and	  has	  its	  own	  choice	  and	  fights	  for	  its	  decisions’39	  at	  an	  economic	  and	  at	  a	  
political	   level.	  Their	  motivation	  to	  act	  and	  get	   involved	   in	  this	  uprising	   in	  Jordan	   is	  mainly	  social,	  
seeing	  that	  ‘there	  is	  a	  clear	  social	  injustice’40	  and	  feeling	  that	  they	  ‘have	  to	  fight	  for	  any	  right	  that	  
has	  been	  stolen’41.	  They	  identify	  this	  social	  situation	  of	  injustice	  ‘with	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  and	  it	  
is	   related	   to	   the	   tyrannical	   authority	   in	   this	   country’42.	   Activists	   address	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  
liberal	  autocratic	  model	  of	  the	  regime	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  social	  mobilisation	  in	  this	  last	  period.	  First,	  
the	   socio-­‐economic	   problematic	   is	   explained	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   country’s	   dependency,	  
privatization,	  and	  its	  social	  effects:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	   Interview	   with	   anonymous	   independent	   activist	   of	   the	   movement	   (that	   does	   not	   belong	   to	   any	   constituency),	  
carried	  out	  by	  the	  author	  in	  Arabic	  on	  the	  22nd	  September	  2013.	  Jabal	  Lweibdeh,	  Amman,	  Jordan.	  
35	   Interview	  with	   anonymous	   activist	   carried	  out	   by	   the	   author	   in	  Arabic	   on	   the	  24th	  August	   2013.	   Jabal	   Lweibdeh,	  
Amman	  
36	  The	  different	  between	  both	  is	  found	  in	  the	  dependency	  their	  families	  have	  on	  them.	  
37	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  author	  in	  Arabic	  on	  the	  13th	  September	  2013.	  Jabal	  Lweibdeh,	  
Amman,	  Jordan.	  
38	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  4th	  September	  2013.	  Op.cit.	  
39	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  author	  in	  Arabic	  on	  the	  5th	  September	  2013.	  Jabal	  Lweibdeh,	  
Amman,	  Jordan.	  
40	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  24th	  August	  2013.	  Op.cit.	  
41	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  5th	  September	  2013.	  Op.cit.	  
42	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  24th	  August	  2013.	  Op.cit.	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‘The	  economic	  problem	  is	  related	  to	  the	  economic	  system	  that	  the	  regime	  puts	  forward	  in	  
the	  country.	  An	  economic	  system	  that	  is	  dependent	  on	  foreign	  aid	  and	  the	  privatization	  and	  
selling	  of	  national	  companies.	  This	  caused	  the	  economic	  liberalization	  that	  impoverishes	  the	  
Jordanian	  society.	  This	  has	  a	  reflection	   in	  social	  classes	  where	  the	  rich	  become	  richer	  and	  
the	  poor	  become	  poorer.’43	  
	  
Second,	  although	  ‘the	  economy	  is	  what	  has	  spread	  a	  lot	  of	  this’,	  for	  it	  is	  what	  affects	  society	  and	  
creates	  social	  grievances	  on	  a	  daily	  basis,	  people	  got	  interested	  in	  politics	  once	  they	  realised	  that	  
the	   economic	   situation	  was	   linked	   to	   the	   political	   system.	  As	   explained	   by	   a	   Jordanian	   blogger,	  
‘that	   connection,	   once	   it	  was	  made,	   it	   could	   not	   be	   separated’44.	   Political	   issues	   of	   concern	   for	  
activists	  of	  the	  movement	  are	  ‘related	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  governments,	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  
the	  lack	  of	  freedom,	  in	  general’45,	  highlighting	  the	  authoritarian	  nature	  of	  the	  regime.	  
	  
Young	  independent	  leaders,	  Youth	  self-­‐organisation:	  the	  path	  of	  experimentation	  	  
The	  Jordanian	  Al-­‐Ḥirāk	  Ash-­‐Shabābī	  (Youth	  Movement)	  is	  the	  only	  youth	  movement	  in	  Jordan	  that	  
is	   actually	   completely	   led	   and	   organised	   by	   youth,	   independent,	   and	  where	   youth	   are	   the	   only	  
ones	  that	  make	  decisions.	  The	  other	  ‘child’	  movements	  depend	  organisationally	  and	  strategically	  
on	  decisions	  taken	  by	  the	  political	  party	  or	  traditional	  movement	  they	  are	  affiliated	  to.	  In	  words	  of	  
an	  activist	  of	  the	  Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement,	  ‘the	  hiraki	  [activist	  of	  the	  movement]	  is	  the	  one	  not	  
linked	   to	   any	   political	   party,	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   it	   is	   a	   youth	  movement	   that	   is	   simple	   and	  
spontaneous.’46	  Overall,	  what	  characterises	  all	  activists	  that	  form	  the	  Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement	  
is	   that	   they	   ‘are	  mainly	  people	  who	  are	   seen	  as	  being	   fed	  up	  with	   classical	  parties,	   fed	  up	  with	  
ideologies’47.	  
‘Jordanian	   youth	   are	   unique	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   they	   are	   expressing	   a	   growing	   discontent	   with	  
political	   parties	   and	   their	   role	   in	   the	   country.	   They	   would	   much	   rather	   see	   candidates	   run	   in	  
elections	   as	   individuals,	   and	   the	   youth	   would	   prefer	   voting	   for	   ideas	   and	   changes	   rather	   than	  
specific	  party	  platforms’	  (Hedengren,	  2013)48	  
The	  movement	  is	  informal	  and	  uninstitutionalized,	  without	  links	  with	  other	  opposition	  actors	  that	  
have	  ‘relations	  with	  the	  regime,	  relations	  with	  authorities’,	  which	  gives	  them	  ideological,	  strategic,	  
and	  organisational	  independence;	  ‘it	  was	  not	  important	  for	  us	  if	  our	  movement	  was	  always	  small	  
in	  relation	  to	  them,	  but	  we	  as	  youth	  would	  be	  able	  to	  decide	  whatever	  we	  wanted	  to.’49	  	  
The	   main	   characteristic	   of	   the	   movement	   is	   that	   is	   rejects	   and	   breaks	   first,	   with	   the	   official	  
opposition,	  which	  are	  those	  legalized	  opposition	  parties	  and	  professional	  associations	  that	  utilize	  
the	   institutionalised	   channels	   of	   political	   participation	   in	   the	   country	   and,	   second,	  with	   the	   so-­‐
called	  alternative	  opposition,	  the	  opposition	  that	  presents	  itself	  as	  the	  option	  capable	  of	  filling	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Ibid.	  
44	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  blogger.	  Op.cit..	  
45	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  24th	  August	  2013.	  Op.cit.	  
46	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  5th	  September	  2013.	  Op.cit.	  
47	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  analyst.	  Op.	  cit.	  
48	  Uniqueness	  of	  Jordanian	  youth	  in	  the	  national	  context,	  as	  this	  is	  a	  generalised	  trend	  in	  the	  Arab	  region.	  See,	  for	  
example,	  DESRUES,	  T.	  &	  KIRHLANI,	  S.	  (2013).	  
49	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  4th	  September	  2013.	  Op.cit.	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political	  void50.	  In	  this	  opposition	  context	  in	  which	  the	  official	  and	  so-­‐called	  alternative	  opposition	  
are	   ‘actually	   the	   same	   in	   a	   way;	   both	   of	   them	   are	   opportunistic,	   both	   of	   them	   are	   not	   really	  
radical,	   they	   are	   both	   trying	   to	   find	   a	   piece,	   or	   their	   own	   piece	   or	   share	   within	   the	   system’51,	  
activists	   in	   the	   Jordanian	   Youth	  Movement	   seek	   to	   open	   new	   spaces	   for	   activism	   independent	  
from	   the	   state.	   Jordanian	   traditional	   political	   actors	   ‘did	   nothing	   and	   they	   became	   part	   of	   the	  
regime	   so	   the	   young	   people	   rejected	   them	   automatically’52.	   Due	   to	   this,	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   young	  
activists	   of	   this	  movement,	   traditional	   political	   parties	   ‘became	  weaker	   because	   they	  were	   not	  
able	  to	  answer	  what	  the	  street	  wanted.	  People	  moved	  way	  faster	  than	  them,	  they	  were	  still	  within	  
their	  structure’53.	  
This	   rupture	   with	   traditional	   politics	   in	   the	   country	   includes	   disagreements	   with	   all	   political	  
parties,	  from	  the	  Islamic	  Action	  Front	  (IAF)	  to	  the	  political	  parties	  of	  the	  traditional	  left.	  Activists	  of	  
the	  Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement	  are	  ‘youth	  who	  very	  often	  identify	  with	  neither	  the	  state	  nor	   its	  
traditional	  opposition	   forces’	   (Ryan,	  2011:	  385).	  Party	  system	  and	  traditional	  political	  opposition	  
groups	  —of	  the	  whole	  ideological	  spectrum—	  is	  perceived	  as	  a	  historically	  constructed	  system	  for	  
exercising	   social	   control.	   It	   is	   the	   only	   movement	   in	   Jordan	   that	   is	   independent	   from	   political	  
parties	   and	   from	   the	   traditional	   opposition	   structure.	   This	   has	   made	   them	   become	   ‘the	   most	  
controversial’	  movement	  in	  the	  country	  (2014	  p.	  74).	  	  
‘We	  try	   to	   find	  a	   third	  way,	  different	   from	  the	   leftist	  and	  nationalist	  political	  parties,	  and	  
the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.	  This	  third	  way	   is	  under	  the	  name	  of	   ‘youth	  movement’,	  which	   is	  
not	  in	  line	  with	  any	  of	  the	  traditional	  ideologies,	  neither	  leftist,	  nor	  nationalist	  or	  Islamist.’54	  	  
	  
What	  they	  want:	  a	  reformist	  or	  a	  radical	  change?	  
In	  terms	  of	  political	  significance	  of	  the	  movement,	   it	   is	   important	  to	   include	  a	  final	  reflection	  on	  
the	  myriad	  of	  conceptualisations	  of	  change	  and	  what	  change	  should	   look	   like	   in	   Jordan	  that	  are	  
present	   in	   the	   movement.	   Given	   its	   structural	   independence,	   and	   its	   complete	   lack	   of	  
institutionalisation,	   movement	   activists	   are	   completely	   outside	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   control	   of	   the	  
regime.	  This	  gives	  them	  the	  space	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  have	  a	  variety	  of	  voices	  that	  include	  reformist	  
and	   radical	   demands.	   Other	   youth	   movements,	   such	   as	   the	   aforementioned	   ‘child’	   youth	  
movements	   linked	   to	   other	   traditional	   opposition	   constituencies,	   are	   controlled	   or	   partly	  
institutionalised	   into	   the	   system.	   This	   mechanism	   of	   social	   control	   provided	   by	   traditional	  
opposition	  parties	  prevents	  youth	  from	  radicalising.	  	  
In	  the	  Jordanian	  opposition	  scene,	  discussions	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  political	  authority	  in	  Jordan	  in	  
the	  official	  opposition	  and	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  alternative	  opposition	  have	  been	  absent,	  and	  ‘both	  the	  
official	  and	  the	  alternative	  oppositions	  consider	  the	  head	  of	  the	  political	  system	  [the	  monarch]	  to	  
be	  some	  sort	  of	  moderating	  sage’	  calling	  for	  a	  ‘change	  in	  policies,	  not	  a	  change	  in	  regime’	  (Bustani,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	   Although	   overall	   the	   movement	   presents	   a	   rupture	   with	   these	   other	   forms	   of	   opposition	   in	   Jordan,	   there	   are	  
individual	  activists	  in	  the	  movement	  that	  have	  links	  with	  other	  opposition	  groups.	  	  
51	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  analyst.	  31st	  July	  2013.	  Jabal	  Lweibdeh,	  Amman,	  Jordan.	  
52	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  13th	  September	  2013.	  Op.cit.	  
53	  Ibid.	  
54	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  5th	  September	  2013.	  Op.cit.	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2011).	  Hisham	  Bustani	  refers	  to	  two	  statements	  by	  members	  of	  both	  opposition	  groups	  presented	  
to	  support	  this	   idea:	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  stated	  that	   ‘the	  Islamists	   in	  Jordan	  call	   for	  reform,	  
not	  a	   total	  change.	  We	  acknowledge	  the	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  regime,’	  and	  the	  Jordanian	  Campaign	  
for	  Change	  (Jayeen),	  that	  includes	  all	  the	  so-­‐called	  alternative	  opposition	  groups,	  stated	  that	  ‘the	  
King	  is	  the	  only	  constant	  in	  Jordanian	  politics’	  and	  stressed	  his	  constitutional	  immunity.	  	  
The	  Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement	  is	  therefore	  the	  only	  movement	  in	  Jordan	  in	  which	  we	  find	  radical	  
voices,	   meaning	   claims	   that	   seek	   regime	   removal	   and	   not	   just	   reform.	   The	   term	   “radical”	   has	  
multiple	   connotations	   and	   has	   been	   defined	   as	   ‘a	   transformation	   of	   systemic	   power	   relations	  
perceived	  to	  sustain	  ongoing	  injustices’	  (Eschle	  and	  Maiguashca,	  2013:	  13).	  Radical	  demands	  tend	  
to	   focus	   on	   complete	   restructuring	   of	   the	   system	   rather	   than	   incorporation	   into	   that	   system	  
(Fitzgerald	   and	   Rodgers,	   2000).	   I	   understand	   radical	   constituencies	   in	   this	   paper	   as	   those	   that	  
demand	  a	  complete	  change	   in	   the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	   system	   in	   the	  country	   through	  
direct	  confrontation	  and	  opposition	  to	  the	  monarchical	  regime	  itself.	  	  
‘The	  issue	  is	  not	  about	  reforming,	  it’s	  not	  about	  taking	  something	  and	  changing	  its	  form.	  It	  
is	  about	  flipping	  the	  table.	  It	  is	  about	  changing	  from	  the	  root.	  It	  is	  the	  change	  so	  the	  people	  
can	  live	  a	  decent	  life,	  specifically,	  the	  poor	  people.’55	  
	  
Activists	  of	  the	  movement	  that	  take	  this	  position	  towards	  change	  explain	  that:	  
‘Radical.	  Why	  not	  reformist?	  Because	  the	  political	  regime	  that	  we	  have	  in	  Jordan,	  the	  core	  
of	  it,	  it	  is	  not	  able	  to	  reform.	  It	  is	  not	  able	  to	  change	  for	  several	  reasons.	  First,	  that	  Jordan	  is	  
connected	   to	   the	   international	   economic	   system,	   and	   the	   political	   decisions	   made	   in	  
agreement	  with	  the	  US.	  And	  our	  economy	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  IMF.	  So	  you	  have	  to	  change	  the	  
regime	  radically	  and	  in	  a	  peaceful	  way.	  Reform	  will	  be	  just	  superficial,	  not	  from	  the	  root.’56	  
	  
Although	  radical	  voices	  exist	  only	  in	  the	  Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement,	  at	  least	  two	  different	  ways	  of	  
conceptualizing	   change	   are	   present	   in	   the	   movement,	   and	   radicalism	   coexists	   with	   reformist	  
voices.	  The	  spectrum	  of	  change	  and	  strategic	  choices	  by	  different	  constituencies	  in	  the	  movement	  
ranges	  from	  radical,	  those	  that	  seek	  totalizing	  or	  complete	  change	  through	  abrupt	  upheaval	  and	  
regime	  overthrow,	  to	  reformist,	  those	  that	  are	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  more	  evolutionary	  process.	  Reformist	  
voices	   inside	   the	   movement	   do	   not	   consider	   that	   change	   will	   only	   be	   achieved	   through	   the	  
removal	  of	  the	  regime.	  They	  adopt	  a	  less	  rupturist	  conceptualisation	  of	  change	  that	  would	  also,	  in	  
their	  view,	  result	  in	  the	  aims	  of	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  transformation.	  There	  are	  variations	  
in	  terms	  of	  what	  ‘reform’	  means	  exactly	  inside	  the	  movement:	  	  
‘No	  one	  agrees	  on	  what	  reform	  is.	  We	  do	  not	  know	  how	  to	  define	  it.	  We	  know	  that	  it	  is	  the	  safer	  
word	  to	  use	   for	  change,	  as	  opposed	  to	  other	  words	  that	  start	  with	   ‘r’,	  but	  at	   the	  same	  time,	  we	  
don’t	   agree	   on	  what	   that	  means	   because	  we	   come	   from	   different	   backgrounds,	   we	   come	   from	  
different	  interests’57	  	  
Radical	  and	  reformist	  voices	  in	  the	  movement	  are	  not	  fixed;	  they	  have	  fluctuated	  in	  time,	  resulting	  
in	   fluctuations	   in	   the	   strategies	   of	   the	   movement.	   Radicalisation	   and	   de-­‐radicalisation	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist.	  24th	  August	  2013.	  Op.cit.	  
56	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  activist,	  in	  Arabic.	  4th	  September	  2013.	  Jabal	  Lweibdeh,	  Amman,	  Jordan.	  
57	  Interview	  with	  anonymous	  blogger.	  4th	  November	  2014.	  Abdoun,	  Amman,	  Jordan.	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movement	   strategies	   since	   its	   appearance	   has	   depended	   on	   the	   regime’s	   varying	   response	   to	  
social	  mobilisation	   in	   the	   country.	  Due	   to	   the	  non-­‐hierarchical	   and	   lose	  organisational	   structure	  
adopted	   by	   the	   Jordanian	   Youth	   Movement,	   they	   have	   been	   more	   vulnerable	   to	   this	   varying	  
opportunity	   structure	   nationally	   and	   regionally.	   In	   words	   of	   an	   activist	   of	   the	   movement,	  
‘circumstances	   are	   the	   ones	   that	   pressure	   you	   to	   take	   one	   or	   another	   decision.’58.	   These	  
circumstances	  are	  built	  on	  the	  different	  political	  moves	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  regime	  in	  response	  to	  
social	  mobilisation.	  	  
	  
The	  Jordanian	  regime’s	  response	  to	  Youth	  mobilisation	  
In	  response	  to	  social	  mobilisation,	  the	  Jordanian	  regime	  has	  put	  forward	  a	  set	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  
moves	  –such	  as	  government	   reshuffles,	   and	  putting	   forward	  a	   roadmap	   to	   reform	   that	   includes	  
constitutional	  amendments,	  reform	  committees	  or	  elections–,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  it	  has	  created	  
greater	   costs	   for	   mobilisation	   through	   the	   use	   of	   repression	   and	   securitization	   –including	   a	  
selective	   application	   of	   the	   law,	   infiltration,	   surveillance,	   street	   repression	   or	   imprisonment	   of	  
activists,	   among	   other.	   This	   balancing	   act	   or	   ‘steam	   valve‘	   forms	   the	   counter	   strategy	   of	   the	  
Jordanian	  regime,	  which	  ‘must	  meet	  opponents’	  minimal	  expectations	  for	  political	  openness	  and	  
participation	  but	  prevent	  them	  from	  undermining	  the	  regime’s	  ultimate	  control’	  (Brumberg,	  2003:	  
6).	  
The	   first	   set	   of	  moves	   that	   the	   Jordanian	   regime	  has	   put	   forward	   in	   order	   to	   respond	   to	   social	  
mobilisation	  since	  2011	  are	  liberal	  democratic	  moves,	  which	  have	  not	  compromised	  the	  regime’s	  
authority	  in	  any	  way,	  and	  have	  been	  part	  of	  this	  balancing	  act	  that	  allows	  for	  a	  controlled	  political	  
participation	  and	  pluralism.	  The	  words	  of	  a	  young	  activist	  of	  the	  movement	  illustrate	  the	  effect	  of	  
these	  liberal	  political	  moves,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  role	  of	  the	  parliament,	  on	  the	  social	  perception	  of	  the	  
political	  process	  in	  Jordan:	  	  
‘They	  come	  and	  tell	  you	  there	  is	  a	  Parliament	  that	  represents	  the	  people,	  but	  who	  are	  these	  
parliamentarians?	  Who	  elects	  them?	  Who	  is	  the	  one	  who	  fakes	  their	  election?	  In	  fact	  there	  
is	  no	  justice,	  the	  government	  is	  not	  trustworthy.	  So	  everything	  is	  an	  empty	  talk	  at	  the	  end.	  
So	  the	  meaning	  of	  democracy	  has	  been	  distorted.’59	  
	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  it	  has	  put	  forward	  these	  diverse	  liberal	  political	  moves,	  the	  Jordanian	  regime	  
has	   reinforced	   its	   nature	   of	   police	   state	   that	   is	   using	   repressive	   and	   selective	   securitization	  
measures	  to	  control	  grassroots	  social	  discontent	  in	  increasingly	  disenfranchised	  and	  marginalised	  
social	   clusters.	   The	   Jordanian	   Youth	   Movement	   has	   been	   particularly	   targeted	   with	   repressive	  
policies.	  As	  so	  many	  international	  eyes	  were	  on	  Jordan,	  as	  they	  were	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  region,	  this	  
repression	  could	  not	  be	  exercised	  through	  open	  attacks,	  so	  different	  diverse	  repressive	  measures	  
have	  been	  developed.	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The	  complex	  simultaneous	  combination	  of	   liberal	  and	  authoritarian	  regime	  moves	  has	  had	  many	  
implications	  for	  the	  organisation	  and	  significance	  of	  the	  Jordanian	  Youth	  Movement	  as	  well	  as	  for	  
the	   future	   of	   social	  mobilisation	   in	   the	   country.	   The	   strategy	   that	   has	   been	  put	   forward	  by	   the	  
Jordanian	   regime	   in	   response	   to	   the	  movement’s	   activities	   has	   had	   different	   results	   at	   a	   social	  
level.	   Overall,	   fear	   has	   taken	   over	   society,	   as	   well	   as	   activists	   of	   the	   movement.	   This	   fear	   has	  
resulted	   in	   almost	   complete	   demobilisation	   and	   in	   the	   silencing	   of	   radical	   voices	   and	   radical	  
demands	  in	  some	  social	  movements.	  	  
‘Now,	  there	  is	  no	  confrontation.	  If	  there	  is	  someone	  who	  wants	  confrontation,	  he	  is	  stupid.	  
He	  is	  opening	  his	  chest	  to	  the	  fire’60	  	  
	  
Despite	  this,	  the	  original	  socio-­‐economic	  burdens	  and	  grievances	  that	  pushed	  disenfranchised	  and	  
marginalised	  social	  clusters,	  such	  as	  youth,	  to	  mobilise	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  2011	  still	  exist.	  In	  some	  
areas,	   they	   have	   even	   been	   worsened	   with	   increasing	   living	   prices,	   justified	   by	   the	   increased	  
economic	   pressure	   on	   the	   regime	   due	   to	   the	   influx	   of	   refugees.	   Therefore,	   in	   the	  words	   of	   an	  
activist	  of	  the	  movement:	  	  
‘Inspiration	  is	  still	  based	  on	  people’s	  suffering,	  or	  your	  own	  suffering	  as	  part	  of	  this	  society.	  
At	  the	  end	  you	  are	  part	  of	  the	  working	  class,	  and	  you	  need	  to	  keep	  fighting	  to	  be	  able	  to	  




In	  this	  article	  I	  have	  presented	  the	  structure	  and	  significance	  of	  the	  Jordanian	  Al-­‐Ḥirāk	  Ash-­‐Shabābī	  
(Youth	  Movement),	  and	  argued	  that,	  in	  Jordan	  this	  movement	  represents	  the	  new	  regional	  trend	  
of	  youth-­‐led,	  youth-­‐organised,	   informal,	  uninstitutionalized,	  horizontal,	  network-­‐like	  organization	  
that	  is	  re-­‐defining	  what	  dissent	  looks	  like	  in	  the	  country	  today.	  By	  analysing	  the	  appearance,	  the	  
organisation	  of	  the	  movement,	  and	  the	  significance	  in	  relation	  to	  several	  challenges	  posed	  by	  the	  
context,	  I	  aim	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  gap	  of	  knowledge	  on	  this	  particular	  youth	  movement.	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